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HUMAN PERFORMANCE TRAINING:
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN CIVIL AVIATION
Alan E. Diehl, Ph.D., ATP, CPE
Retired NTSB, FAA & USAF Air Safety Investigator
Albuquerque, New Mexico
For over twenty years, two similar types of training have attempted to reduce aviator
caused accidents. Crew Resource Management was widely adopted by U.S. airlines, and
has generally been credited with helping to dramatically reduce their accident rates.
Interestingly, CRM was embraced with little scientific evidence that it could actually
reduce operational errors. In contrast, Aeronautical Decision Making, aimed at general
aviation users, underwent a series of double-blind experiments before being adopted.
And, although some users suggested ADM training significantly reduced their accidents,
it was never fully implemented. This may explain the limited improvement in general
aviation accident rates, when compared with the airline rates for the last two decades.
“Human error” has historically been associated with approximately three quarters of all
aviation accidents, and various studies have indicated aviator decision making failures were
associated with the majority of fatal civilian crashes, (e.g., Diehl, 1992). Two major training
efforts were launched in the 1980s to deal with these problems. These similar programs, Crew
Resource Management and Aeronautical Decision Making, were proffered as cost-effective and
quick methods of reducing such accidents.
Crew Resource Management
While serving as a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, I drafted the first
recommendation calling for the implementation of Crew Resource Management training by this
nation’s airlines. This occurred after a 1978 United Airlines DC-8 crash. The crew detected a
landing gear unsafe light, and entered a holding pattern, only to run out of fuel 66 minutes later
over the suburbs of Portland, Oregon. The captain, fixating on the gear light problem, had
ignored repeated queries from the other two crew members about their fuel status, (NTSB, 1979).
Per the NTSB recommendation, United instituted CRM training in 1981. And within
several years most U.S. major carriers followed suit. Although, the Federal Aviation
Administration did not formally require CRM for all FAR Part 121 carriers until 1995.
NTSB investigators must carefully justify proposed recommendations. So I examined the
limited evidence that CRM training would work. I reviewed the research conducted earlier under
the direction of Dr. John Lauber at the NASA Ames Research Center, including the simulator
studies done by Dr. H. P. Ruffell-Smith. In addition, contemporary research on the recognition of
“subtle incapacitation” done at United Airlines as well as Line Oriented Flight Training being
conducted by Northwest Airlines, looked promising.
As an adjunct professor of management, I also recognized the similarity of CRM to
another type of training used in industrial settings. Total Quality Management empowered
workers to speak-up and actively participate in decision making about products and production
processes. TQM had been successfully utilized for decades and was credited with helping the

successful renaissance in Japanese industry after World War II. Ironically, it was the brainchild
of an American, Dr. Edwards Deming.
CRM-related errors also seemed to be factors in several well-known crashes. These
accidents included the 1972 Eastern Airlines L-1011 crash into the Everglades and the tragic
collision of the KLM and Pan-American B-747s on the runway at Tenerife in 1977. Such
catastrophes suggested that issues like loss of situational awareness, communication breakdowns,
as well as individual and collective judgment errors needed to be addressed.
Thus, adopting CRM training seemed logical, even without any statistical data or
controlled experiments to “prove” it worked. In any case, I felt a new type of training to manage
resources on the flight deck was an idea whose time had come, and the NTSB members, as well
as United’s management and the union apparently agreed.
The FAA authorized an18-month evaluation of the prototype CRM program. The
Agency even assisted United to defer some of the costs of the program’s development, and the
two-day training sessions for its flight crews. The FAA did this by granting the airline an
“exemption” allowing its captains to take line checks, instead of going to simulator training every
six months. Thus, captains only received simulator training once a year. I was aware of this
arrangement, because I had transferred from the NTSB to become the FAA headquarters program
scientist for human performance, in 1981.
However, some people legitimately questioned whether this type of training really
worked. The term “psycho-babble” was used by some FAA bureaucrats. But I retorted that
CRM training provided a host of pragmatic techniques to reduce the probability and the
consequences of errors -- what others would later call “threat and error management.”
Other airlines soon approached the FAA requesting exemptions for their proposed CRM
programs, but not all of these programs were well designed. This was a legitimate concern for
the Agency. So, in 1983, I hired Dr. Richard Jensen to examine cutting-edge CRM training
programs in use around the globe, and to show the FAA how best to certify such programs and
airmen enrolled therein.
I was also delighted to hear that NASA was also developing instruments like the Cockpit
Management Attitude Questionnaire to evaluate the views of airmen about CRM. However, such
measures could not answer the question of whether this training reduced the number of errors
during “normal” much less emergency operations, (Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich, 1993).
But perhaps the best evidence that CRM actually worked came from a couple of
accidents experienced by United Airlines crews after being exposed to the concepts for several
years. In August 1989 a United DC-10’s center engine exploded in-flight, severing hydraulic
lines and eliminating all aerodynamic controls. The only way to control the jet was through
differential power of the two remaining engines, (NTSB, 1990a).
The DC-10 crew led by Captain Al Haynes allowed another off-duty captain handle the
thrust levers, and they were able to successful crash land at the Sioux City airport. This widely
reported feat of airmanship saved the lives of the majority of the passengers aboard the ill-fated
craft. Captain Haynes has repeatedly stated the use of CRM was essential in their success that
fateful afternoon, (Haynes, 1991).

Several months earlier another United crew faced an almost as demanding situation.
Their 747 had departed Honolulu, but as they passed through 22,000 feet, a forward cargo door
failed, ripping away part of the aircraft’s fuselage. The explosive decompression ejected nine
passengers and baggage, and damaged both starboard engines, along with the wing’s leading edge
devices, (NTSB, 1990b).
Using various CRM techniques they managed to safely return to Hawaii without the
further loss of life. For instance, the second officer soon recognized they were far too heavy for
the rapidly up-coming two-engine-out emergency landing. But, he just could not get the
bewildered captain’s attention, so he quickly decided to dump fuel himself. I appreciated the
irony of this situation, because in my 1978 United DC-8 crash, the second officer could not get
the captain’s attention about their low fuel state. Certainly, CRM techniques played a role in
saving this 747 and its passengers.
Obviously, trying to make precise statistical statements about extremely infrequent events
is always a problem. It has been noted elsewhere that because airline accidents are so infrequent
it is difficult to establish the precise role that CRM has played in the reduction in these accidents,
(Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999).
Furthermore, many things besides the use of CRM have changed in the aviation system in
recent decades. These changes included: the advent of highly automated airliners, more effective
air traffic management procedures, installation of newer types of cockpit warning devices, all of
which probably helped enhance airline safety.
Incidentally, the USAF Military Airlift Command began using CRM in 1985. This
change was ordered by their commander and took place in just three-months. While military
transports faced different flying conditions, often with less experienced crews, it was interesting
to examine the statistical changes that occurred after this program began.
I computed there was a 51% reduction in mishaps during the five-year period after the
program’s implementation, when compared with the previous five-year period. This was
statistically significant at the .05 level. And unlike the protracted airline implementation period,
little else changed for this command during that decade-long time span. Thus, this military
evidence suggested CRM was a factor in the improved airline safety, (Diehl, 1992).
Aeronautical Decision Making
The other major type of human performance training focused on general aviation pilots.
It was originally called “judgment training” and the initial research was led by Dr. Richard Jensen
under FAA contract in the mid-1970s. A major conclusion of his landmark study was that 52%
of U.S. fatal general aviation accidents were caused by pilot judgment errors. Jensen also
recommended that prototype training materials be developed and their effectiveness be measured,
(Jensen & Benel, 1977).
The “judgment training” label continued through the development of the early manuals
and other materials. This work was done at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, under the
leadership of Dr. Jerry Berlin. I was soon asked by FAA officials to assume the technical
direction of the program as well as the evaluation of the prototype materials. The FAA wanted to
insure such training was effective before proceeding further.

Judgment training materials taught many of the same concepts used by airline CRM
programs, but the information and case studies were drawn from general aviation situations and
single pilot operations. Subject pilots learned about the effects that several types of hazardous
attitudes have on performance, as well as concepts such as stress management, risk management,
and attention management.
And they were also given various “rules and tools” to help improve their decisionmaking. For example, the “I’M SAFE” mnemonic reminded subjects that before flying they
needed to insure they were free of the following conditions: Illness, Medications, Stress, Alcohol,
Fatigue, and to ensure they had Eaten properly.
A major challenge in evaluating this training was whether or not pilots would use the
concepts in “normal” situations. Determining if those pilots who had received judgment training
performed differently than control group subjects was a requirement. It was decided to measure
the decision-making of all pilots during short cross-country flights when they did not know their
judgment was being carefully observed.
After receiving the prototype judgment training materials, Embry Riddle subject pilots
made 17% fewer decisional errors than student pilots in the control group who had not received
this training. These results, while preliminary, suggested pilot judgment could be improved
through training, (Berlin, et. al., 1982).
Various organizations around the world became interested in the topic. For instance,
Gary Livack and his employer the General Aviation Manufacturers Association offered to help
develop cutting-edge audiovisual materials along with improved training manuals.
Dr. Georgette Bush of Transport Canada led the effort there, and conducted two
additional studies. One study examined private pilots and another involved pilots training for
their commercial licenses. Both studies used the new and improved training manuals, and the
commercial students also were exposed to more sophisticated audiovisual materials. The two
double-blind studies in Canada indicated private pilots receiving judgment training averaged 9%
fewer errors, while commercial pilots (who got a more comprehensive program) averaged 40%
fewer errors, when compared to those pilots assigned to the respective control groups, (Bush and
Diehl, 1983).
An additional study of private pilot judgment was undertaken for the Australian
government by Dr. Ross Telfer. While another study, sponsored by the USAF and directed by
Dr. Tom Connelly, used instrument-rated ROTC cadets. Here pilots faced simulated emergencies
in GAT-1 instrument training devices.
In all five experiments, pilots receiving judgment training outperformed their
contemporaries at statistically significant levels. The measured improvements averaged from a
low of 8% fewer errors up to 46% fewer errors in the case of the instrument rated pilots study.
This wide variation in the amounts of experimental group improvement was attributed to: the
differences in the quality of the training manuals, the sophistication of other training media, and
the emphasis placed on this training by instructors, (Diehl, 1992).
The FAA and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association wondered what would be the
effect of making judgment training available, but not mandatory. So I made another study of
private pilots at ten fixed base operators in the U.S. This time the experimental subjects were

simply given the training manuals without any encouragement or instructions on how to use
them.
The FAA was also evaluating new sectional chart designs at the time, which provided an
opportunity to observe the “normal” behavior of both experimental and control group subjects.
Incidentally, the observers posed as cartographers, while unobtrusively recording the in flight
judgment performance of subjects.
The results of this well-controlled double-blind study produced a 10% reduction in errors
for the experiment pilots who were given the manuals. While statistically significant, the results
also suggested the training would be much more effective if the subjects believed they were going
to be evaluated on the materials during actual FAA flight tests, (Diehl, 1992).
And it was soon concluded the “judgment” was not the best label for such training. This
was because many student pilots were older, highly successful, professional people who did not
think their youngish instructors could improve their judgment. Hence, I decided to rebrand the
training as Aeronautical Decision Making. And a series of ADM training manuals was developed
for various categories of pilots, such as Students and Private Pilots, Instrument Pilots, Air Taxi
Pilots, Helicopter Pilots, etc.
Shortly after these training manuals were completed in 1987, I transferred from FAA to
the USAF, and several other key personnel associated ADM development also went on to other
assignments. The result was this training was never fully implemented by the FAA. In fact, it
was not until 1997 that it became “theoretically” mandatory training.
Interestingly, some people in the helicopter community immediately embraced this
training. Bell Helicopters Inc. and Petroleum Helicopters Inc. vigorously pursued ADM training
for the pilots flying their equipment. These two organizations soon reported dramatic drops in
their respective accidents rates. Bell saw a 48% drop in their U.S. Jetrangers accidents, while
PHI experienced a 54% drop in their accidents, (Fox, 1991; Adams & Diehl, 1988).
Unfortunately, unlike Bell and PHI, the broader general aviation community never
thoroughly applied ADM concepts. Ironically, a 1999 study by former FAA inspector, Doug
Hawley, confirmed this fact. He determined that Certified Flight Instructors spend very little time
teaching ADM. In fact, of the instructors he surveyed, 33% had never heard of ADM, only 13%
knew it was actually mandatory, and a mere 3% could explain how to obtain the FAA materials
needed to teach these concepts, (Hawley, 1999).
Conclusions
The widely applied CRM training programs appear to have helped dramatically reduce
airline accidents in recent decades. Furthermore, the failure to give general aviation pilots ADM
training may well have contributed to the relatively paltry reduction in their accidents.
The U.S. general aviation accident data stands in sharp contrast with the progress made
by this nation’s airlines over the past 20 years. In fact, the latest data available from the NTSB
(for 1990 to 2009) indicates the accident rate for all fatal FAR Part 121 airlines decreased by
78%, while the rate for all fatal general aviation accidents declined by only 15 %, (NTSB, 2010).
While annual fatal accident rates, especially for airlines are often volatile, other metrics tell a
similar story.

Concerns about drawing firm conclusions on the safety of such different types of flying
are certainly relevant. However, the large differences in the changes in their respective accident
rates during this twenty-year period suggests further study of the roles played by CRM and ADM
training is warranted.
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